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China and India
Learning from History, Building the Present and 
Avoiding Narratives on their ”Unescapable Clash”
ŞERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU, SILVIU PETRE
There is a body of common knowledge in international politics, which is hard to 
reject by anyone. One of them is about the so-called ”inexorable” rise of the Asia-Pacific 
region playing the role of a geopolitical pivotal area. If one believe this ”prophecy” 
– which is based on statistical evidence but also on a huge dose of wishful thinking 
–, then one must accept the scenario that the great powers during this century will 
compete for wealth, power and security in that region1.
In this area, India and China are certainly the most populous countries and also in 
the world, both largerly exceeding one billion inhabitants and also ranking among the 
territorially largest states in the world, after the Russian Federation. Thus, no wonder 
that journalists, strategic analysts and even ordinary people call them ”giants”, or 
use symbolic animal names (dragon, elephnat, tiger etc.) and consider their bilateral 
relations and mutual perceptions/expectations to be among the decisive elements to 
shape the configuration of the world security architecture in this century. Not only are 
they populous, with a continental-like dimension, representing the inheritors of ancient 
and brilliant civilizations, but they are also direct neighbors, thus it is obvious that 
their leaders must conceive national and regional security policies taking into account 
also the perceived risks, threats and opportunities arising from the other one, beyond 
the borders. Nowadays, the two countries are among the biggest fast-rising economies 
in the world, belonging to the so-called BRICS group of countries (Brasil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa), which are expected to be strong economic competitors for the 
West in the future and even overpass it. China is a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council while India is a possible candidate to this position.
As one could expect, given the importance of these countries, there is a rich 
international relations and strategic studies litterature dealing with the Sino-Indian 
relations. Not only Chinese and Indian experts are constantly contributing to the 
debate, but also American and European ones, almost all of them focusing either on 
the military side of security or on the economic competition. Generally, International 
Relations (IR) ”realist” authors emphasize the perspective of an increasing and 
”unavoidable” conflict while liberals think the cooperation logic will prevail, ensuring 
peaceful relations between the two powerful actors. But what is striking is that a 
multitude of the analyses is focusing on the so-called ”inevitability” of this long-
term rivalry, suggesting that the power acumulated by the two actors will generate 
an unstable balance of power mechanism ending in a dangerous security dilemma 
and even a possible war. Not only American neorealist authors use this conflictual 
1 Jacek KUGLER, ”The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?”, 
International Studies Perspectives, no. 7, 2006, pp. 36–42; Brad GLOSSERMAN, ”Asia’s Rise Far 
from Inevitable”, Asia Times online, Jul. 22, 2009; Lord MALLOCH-BROWN, ”Is Asia’s Rise 
Inevitable?”, Asian Affairs, vol. 41, issue 3, 2010, pp. 325-336. See also Brahma CHELLANEY, 
”The Resistible Rise of Asia?”, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-
resistible-rise-of-asia-, May 1, 2012.
288
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 2 • 2013
ŞERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU, SILVIU PETRE
matrix, but also Indian and Chinese thinkers which probably know that being a 
modern Cassandra is more rewarding than playing the optimistic view1. Journalists, 
of course, have an innate tendency towards this kind of rivalry-based discourse, as 
they anticipate the needs of the readers2.
In this study, we want to show that the simple increse of power, be it material 
(economic, military, demographic) and non-material (innovation, culture, norms, 
legitimacy – what Joseph Nye called ”soft power”) does not automatically lead to 
insecurity and conflict if it is not associated with some specific decision-making 
outcomes, which are based on cognitive perceptions, cultural practices and institutional 
characteristics. Using the work of constructivist author Alexander Wendt, we know 
that systemic ”anarchy” in IR does not automatically mean conflict and war, because 
”anarchy is what states make of it”3.
Paying Attention to Complexity in the Notion
of Complex Interdependence
 There is an ongoing debate about the effects of trade for the production of peace 
and the taming of conflict. An ever growing literature generated has accompanied 
IR for more than eighty years. Both liberals and realist like to return and evoke as a 
ritualized moment Norman Angell’s book – The Great Illusion published just before 
the outbreak of WWI (1910)4. Angell’s intellectual effort tried to analyse the web of 
relations which bound in togetherness the international stage of both great and small 
nations. His conclusion advocated the irrationality of an all out conflict as trade was 
more profitable and less costly than the domino crisis begun in Sarajevo. While realists 
use Angell’s book as a catechism for naivete, liberals have tried to pay more attention 
to such early writings and improve their credo upon them5 .
While Waltz disavowed the growth of interdependence in the later decades of 
the Cold War6, newer realists learned to take economic flows into account but are 
1 Barry BUZAN, ”China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?”, The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, vol. 3, issue 1, 2010, pp. 5-36.
2 Waheguru Pal SINGH SIDHU, Jing-dong YUAN, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2003.
3 Alexander WENDT, ”Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics”, International Organization, vol. 46,no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425.
4 Sir Norman ANGELL, The Great Illusion, Cosimo, Inc., New York, 2007.
5 For an assessment of Norman Angell place in the intellectual history of British liberalism 
see: Christopher J. FETTWEIS, ”Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The Obsolescence of Great 
Power Geopolitics”, Comparative Strategy, Issue 22, 2003, pp. 109-129; Torbjorn KNUTSEN, 
”Cowboy Philosophy? A Centenary Appreciation of Norman Angell’s ’Great Illusion’”, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 50th Annual Convention ”Exploring the Past, 
Anticipating the Future”, New York Marriott Marquis, New York City, NY, USA, Feb. 15, p. 200. 
See also Daniel W. DREZNER, ”The Ten Worst Books in International Relations”, Foreign Policy, 
April 10, 2009, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/10/the_top_ten_worst_
books_in_international_relations, accessed on May 4, 2013.
6 Kenneth N. WALTZ, ”Globalization and Governance”, Political Science and Politics, vol. 
32, no. 4, Dec. 1999, pp. 693-700; IDEM, ”Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International 
Security, vol. 25, no. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5-41.
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nonetheless skeptical towards an improvement of security as result of trade. They 
argue that increasing interdependence goes hand in hand with increasing vulnerability. 
As a middle ground in this debate Dale Copeland writes that interdependence and 
commerce in themselves do not tame the dogs of war and a better explanation should 
add extra factors. According to Copeland the perceptions of ruling elites vis-a-vis the 
prospects of trade are even more salient than the level of economic interaction. If the 
prospects of trade are benefits-prone than the likelyhood of warmongering declines. 
If however the ruling elites are pessimistic with regards to trade flows and believe 
military actions should have meager costs then they are likely to engage in a conflict. 
Copeland uses the example of Soviet-American relations during detente time from 
the 1970s to early 1980s1.
Building upon Copeland we understand the dilemma of trade& war in the 
frame of political economy. While politics and economics are often separated for 
methodological purposes, in real life they mingle in intricate ways. States and markets 
seldom interact with consequences often ignored or non-evident for decision-makers. 
We assert that trade alone does not make up for interdependence. In order for two or 
several countries to be considered interdependent their mutual flows and settlement 
must have a certain degree. Only then one can witness a mutual spillover and predict 
from there the possibilities of war and peace. If rival countries are still benevolent 
to each other and pursue trade but at a modest or moderate level we will consider 
them engaged in economic diplomacy, meaning that it’s only pseudo-interdependence 
provided by state factors as a gesture of good will. 
Thus, our research questions will be: who exactly in China and in India has the 
authority to decide if the other state could be seen as a risk, a threat or a security 
partner? How dependent are these decision-makers on the society as a whole? How 
much influenced are they by the main historic events, national mithology, collective 
traumas and psychosis or cultural factors? How influent are the Chinese and Indian 
military elites when dealing with the politicians and the societies regarding the 
behaviour towards the other state?
This study is based on some specific hypothesis.
1. In order to understand Chinese and Indian foreign and security policies in their 
bilateral relations it is necessary but nou enough to know the accurate level of power 
they both have and also their perceptions on power and security. Security patterns 
are dependent on political culture and strategic culture embodied and embedded in 
elite perception;
2. Political, military and intellectual elites generally shape the foreign and security 
policies narratives and run the state affairs more than the pure state bureaucracy;
3. Newly discovered economic interdependence turn the table around either 
a bellicose or a pacifist outcome depending on those elites view of their strategic 
neighborhoods.
We will investigate the relations between India and China using historic 
narratives, strategic studies tools and appropriate theories.
1 Dale C. COPELAND, ”Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace Détente: 1970-1974, 
1985-1991 and the End of Cold War”, in Jean-Marc F. BLANCHARD, Edward D. MANSFIELD, 
Norrin M. RIPSMAN (eds.), Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence and National 
Security, Frank Cass&Colt Ltd., London, 2000, pp. 15-39/p. 16.
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China is Rising But Unfortunately for It, It’s Not the Only One!
To use a tabloidic phraseology, China is the world arena incontestable ”diva”, 
because of its huge economic growth, unmatched population and famous rivalry 
with the US for systemic hegemony1. Chinese feel more and more confortable with 
this image, they cultivate nationalist feelings and geopolitical ambitions embedded in 
traditional politial views based on their Confucian-Daoist inheritage plus the marxist 
influence. Most of these traditional views cultivate moderation and non-provocative 
developments, the most famous being Deng Xiaoping’s advice about ”hidding the 
brighteness and nourishing obscurity” (tao guang yang hui) and ensure a peaceful rise2.
But at the same time Chinese feel that the main rival, the USA, is gradually 
building partnerships with neighbors of China to try to contain Chinese power and 
limit its security options3. India is such an incomode player, because it is almost 
as populous and huge as China, with economic rise and human capabilities, with 
a strong army and geopoltical goals in the neighboring areas. India is rising at the 
same time as China and it is thought to play an important role in the ”movie” of 
China’s strive to dominate its regional system and may be the world, in spite of the 
official claim of peaceful rise. India will surpass China in population and it is a true 
democracy, while China is led by an authoritarian-regime which is only gradually 
moving to social openess. They are both capitalist (free market) states but China 
started its reform years before India, after 1979, and still enjoys a significant edge over 
India. But Chinese leaders know that economic accidents could change the balance or 
even a regional war could occur, in which China could be involved, with disastrous 
consequences, and these could help India to become an element hindering Chinese 
domination of Asia.
American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski depicted India as being ”a complicated 
mixture of democratic self-governance, massive social injustice, economic dynamism 
and widespread political corruption”4.
Indian analyst Mohan Malik rightly described India-Chinese relations as 
follows: ”the relationship is complicated by layers of rivalry, mistrust, and occasional 
cooperation, not to mention actual geographical disputes”5.
1 Shaun BRESLIN, ”China’s Rise to Leadership in Asia – Strategies, Obstacles and 
Achievements”, Conference Paper, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, 
December 11 and 12, 2006. See also Zhang XIAOMING, Barry BUZAN, ”Correspondence, 
Debating China’s Peaceful Rise”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 3, 2010, pp. 447-
460. See also Martin JACQUES, ”Welcome to China’s Millennium”, The Guardian, 23 June 2009.
2 Yang WENCHANG, ”Diplomatic Words of Wisdom”, 2011-10-29, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english2010/indepth/2011-10/29/c_131218962.htm, accessed on 3 December 2012.
3 Martin JACQUES, When China Rules The World: The End of the Western World and the Birth 
of a New Global, Penguin, 2nd edition, 2012. This well-known author thinks that the Chinese 
possible hegemony in the future will also take the form of cultural influence on the world 
system of states. This kind of power would be much more difficult to counter by USA.
4 Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, Strategic Vision, Basic Books, New York, 2012, p. 19.
5 Mohan MALIK, ”China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare”, July/
August 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org., accessed on 20 April 2013.
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Lessons of the History: Trust Me At Your Own Risk!
In an interesting game of parrallel history, China and India represent the succesors 
of ancient civilizations and empires which dominated the world system and the 
vanished under the assault of invading forces: Mongols, Mughals, British, Russian, 
Japanese, British and American ones. Buddhism, one of world’s five great religions 
was born in Nepal, proliferated, almost dissapeared from there only to flourish again 
in Southeast Asia and beyond the slopes of Chomolungma1.
India has been a British colony for centuries and its state, its borders had been 
traced by the colonial master which withdrew after WWII and let behind a bloody 
civil war (in fact more a religious sectarian one) which ended in the secession of 
Pakistan. China also began a gradual decline after the 15th century and in the 19th one 
lost huge territories to Russian empire (via the „Unequal treaties”), lost the opium 
war with Great Britain, lost the first war with Japan in 1894-1895 for the domination of 
Korea and Taiwan, then was crushed at the beginning of the 20th century by a military 
intervention of Western powers (the ”Boxer rebellion”). China, after becoming a 
communist state, welcomed the good relations with India, a country which stood 
apart from both the communist and the capitalist blocks, while India immediately 
recognized PRC as a state and considered it a close neighbour. One should mention 
especially the ”Panchsheel Agreement” of April 29, 1954 between the two states, as 
it mentioned the ”five principles” of peaceful co-existence and mutual trust: India 
explicitely recognized the Chinese economic and political control on Tibet, giving 
up the privileges it has inherited from the British Crown, originating in the Anglo-
Tibetan Treaty of 19042. Delhi agreed to this, in exchange for the confidence-building 
and security with its main neighbor, in the spirit of ”friendship and brotherhood” 
claimed by Indian and Chinese leaders. More than that, India boycotted the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty on the grounds that the settlement did not return the island of 
Formosa (Taiwan) to China. Even in 1962, at the peak of territorial dispute, Chinese 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai reminded India’s leader Nehru that: 
”’Our two peoples’ common interests in their struggle against imperialism 
outweighby far all the differences between our two countries. We have a major 
responsibility for Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and Asian 
peace”3.
But the growing nationalism and the opposing ideologies found a reason for 
conflict in a border disppute. It seems that China wanted to build a strategic railway 
from Xinjiang to Tibet passing through eastern Kashmir, a plan that was seen by 
1 Hermann KULKE, Dietmar ROTHERMUND, O istorie a Indiei, Romanian transl. by 
Loredana Tiron, Editura Artemis, Bucureşti, 2003, pp. 60, 159-167; Shenali WADUGE, ”Why 
Buddhism Prospered in Asia But Died in India”, Asian Tribune, June 10, 2012.
2 David M. MALONE, Does the Elephant Dance?, Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2011, p. 131 and passim. Similar agreements between Beijing and 
Delhi were signed in 1993 and 1996 but without using the name ”Panchsheel”, even if the 
”five principles” of peaceful co-existence were always mentioned. In Buddhist philosophy, 
Panchsheel (a Sanskrit world) was the name of the ”five taboos/virtues” that a good Indian 
must respect during his life.
3 Ibidem, p. 132.
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India as a catastrophe, because it would have linked China to Pakistan in a very 
direct way1.
Thus in 1962, Chinese armed forces defeated the Indian ones and this explains 
why even today why the bilateral relations are not quite normal, not to say friendly. 
Retrospectively, one could say that the first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru 
trusted too much the Chinese2, believed in their rethorical pacifism and hesitated to 
increase the military power of the country. Nehru is well-known for being one of the 
most prominent leaders of the Thirld World (non-alignement) movement and thus 
willing to keep a separate way from USSR and USA. 
However, Nehru’s affair with Idealpolitik3 (versus classical practiced Realpolitik) 
must not be spelled as a by-word for naivete4. No doubt about it, he was idealistic 
at his country’s own risks, but at the same time aknowledged the imperative of 
supporting words with swords. Unfortunatelly for Indian military security, his grasp 
of international relations during the first decades of Cold War a fact which explains 
why India entered the war in a state of visible material and psychological under-
preparedness. Witnesses mentioned that during his prime minister mandate, Nehru 
personally controlled the foreign and security policy of India, a country which did 
not have its own foreign policy before the independence5 and consequently lacked the 
necessary expertise. As K.P.S. Menon, secretary of foreign affairs, explained, Nehru’s 
1 Robert D. KAPLAN, The Revenge of Geography, Random House, New York, 2012, p. 156.
2 If one bothers to index the word China in Nehru main book – Glimpses of World History, 
written in prison and published in 1935 it would find out 134 citation, notes Ramachandra 
Guha. Ramachandra GUHA, ”Jawaharlal Nehru And China: A Study In Failure?”, Harvard-
Yenching Institute Working Paper Series, http://www.harvard-yenching.org/sites/harvard-
yenching.org/files/featurefiles/Ramachandra%20Guha_Jawaharlal%20Nehru%20and%20China.
pdf, accessed on 3 December 2011, p. 2. 
3 Public memory cherishes him as a pacifist who despised war, alliances, security pacts and 
did not want a powerful army nor a binding strategic planning. He is said to have even wanted 
people in the MoD to work in civilian clothes! See Fareed ZAKARIA, Lumea postamericană, 
Romanian transl. by Crisia Miroiu, Polirom, Iaşi, 2009, pp. 138-139. It has become an already 
established cliche to see Nehru’s halo as an extension of Mahatma’s and therefore label their 
successive roles as a John the Baptist - Christ Savior frame. Some of this myth may hold big chunks 
of truth, but at the same time Nehru’s friendship with Homi Bhaba, the father of Indian atomic 
program as well as his support of the Mahalanobis plan envisaging rapid industrialization, 
casts India’s first prime minister more like a balanced modernist with secularist view. Shasi 
THAROOR, Nehru. Inventarea Indiei, Romanian transl. by Marina Elena Tătărâm and Alina 
Gabriela Vasile, Paideia, 2008. For English version see: Shasi THAROOR, Nehru. The Invention 
of India, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2003. For Homi Bhaba patronage of the seminal steps 
in India’s nuclear development see: Leonard WEISS, ”India and the NPT”, Strategic Analysis, 
vol. 34, no. 2, March 2010, pp. 255-271/pp. 255-263; Hina PANDEY, “Atoms for Peace: Balancing 
the Promotion of Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation”, Air Power and Space Studies Journal, 
vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 25-45/pp. 25-27, http://www.aerospaceindia.org/Air%20
Power%20Journals/Summer%202011/Chapter%202.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2013.
4 An essay analysis of Nehru real-ideal-politik alternative stances read: Baldev Raj NAYAR, 
T.V. PAUL, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, Contemporary South Asia, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
5 Of course one can point the existence of a certain Empire of the Raj, as Robert Blyth 
put sit. It as actually a form of descentralized diplomacy which divided competence spheres 
between London, the metropolis and the viceroy of India. For more see Robert J. BLYTH, The 
Empire of the Raj. India, Eastern Afria and the Middle East, 1858-1947, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.
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own vision and prejudices led the foreign policy of India in such critical times. He 
did not listen to the advice of Lord Mounbatten, the last British vice-roy of India, 
who wanted a strong defense sector and a strongman as head of the General Staff1. 
So, Delhi lost the border war in a desastrous way. This demonstrated to Indians that 
being highly moralistic while underplaying the hard power and the enemy intentions 
was not a good strategy for the survival of the nation. Indians acquired a deep 
mistrust concerning China and the famous expression Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai (Indians 
and Chinses are brothers)2 remained a simple wording, even if Chinese army quikly 
withdrew from the occupied areas in Indian territory. Using the irony of the English 
word, one may notice that after the 1962 deblacle Hindi Sini Bhai-Bhai became Hindi 
Sini Bye-Bye! From a military point of view, China certainly had an edge over India, 
as it has a well-trained Army, which fought three wars: against Japan, against the 
nationalists in the civil war and then against US in Korea.
Later, India seemed to have learned this lesson and became somewhat more ware-
proned and winned two wars against Pakistan, in 1965 and 1971, while China, in spite 
of the alliance with Pakistan stood aside. Beijing tolerated the secession of Bangladesh 
from Pakistan and adopted a neutral stance towards the Kashmir dispute, even if 
Pakistan gave China in the years ’60s a small piece of land near Kashmir, which is 
often claimed by India. 
India’s quest for Independence, understood as self-reliance (swaraj) did not end 
in August 1947. In the perception of the Raisina Hill decolonisation could not really 
end until the subalterns (to use a catchword from the historian Gayatri C. Spivak) 
were at the same table with their former masters. It is to be said that Nehru himself 
considered the military potential of nuclear might. His speech near the passing of the 
Atomic Act (April 15, 1948) is revealing: 
”We must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war – indeed I think 
we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. ... Of course, 
if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious 
sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way”3.
India’s entrance in the nuclear club received first inputs in 1953 when president 
Eisenhower started Atoms for Peace – an ambitious initiative aiming to transfer civil 
nuclear technology and expertise to developing countries. At that time Washington 
sympathised with South Asia’s Ghandian legacy. During those years more than a 
1 Fareed ZAKARIA, Lumea postamericană, cit., p. 139.
2 It has to be mentioned that the idea of a Sino-Indian brotherhood painted on the wider 
canvass of Asianism predated Nehru and the generation of Bandung. Sparkles of this spirit 
could be seen in the early decades of the XXth century. See for instance Sun Yat Sen’s 1924 speech: 
Sun Yat Sen, Panasianism (1924), Society for Asian Integration, http://www.asianintegration.
com/Publications/Articles/Others/Pan-Asianism%20by%20Sun%20Yat-Sen.html, accesed on 
April 20, 2013. Especially after World War I the promises of Versailles echoed into hopes that 
an alliance of Asian peoples would cast aside the yoke of European dominion. In India, for 
the sake of the conversation, people such as Taraknath Das fantasied about a German-Indian 
approchement forged against Britain. Sven SAALER, Christopher W.A. SZPILMAN (eds.), 
Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, 1850–1920, vol. I, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 
p. 244 and passim.
3 Raj CHENGAPPA, Weapons of Peace, Harper Collins Publishers, India, 2000, p. 79.
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thousand Indian scientists came to America and returned to their country with 
knowledge. The affair turned sour in 1968 when India – albeit a supporter of de-
nuclearisation- refused to sign the NPT, sign as an oligarchic pact between already 
possessing nuclear states. A descendant path soon followed- while Nixon worked to 
befriend the Chinese and mollify the Soviets, his administration record with Indira 
Ghandi went to the ground1. After a second bitter conflict with Pakistan in 1971, 
New Delhi conducted a civil nuclear test in 1974. It was a three layer motivation: 
preemption against Pakistani inception of a nuclear program in the aftermath of the 
1971 defeat; fear of China which exploded a bomb a decade later and la grandeur – 
ambition to be held as an international actor to be reckon with. This was to be echoed 
by a second nuclear set of tests in May 1998 at Pokhran.
This was seen as illegal by many countries, since India did not sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Even the fact that the Indian prime minister invoked 
the China threat to justify the possession of nuclear bombs was not seen as a valid 
argument by the international community. Beijing angrily reacted to the Indian 
allegations of a ”China threat” denying them. Anyway, for strategic and geopolitical 
reasons, US president G.W. Bush Jr. negotiated and signed a nuclear treaty with 
Delhi, in 2005-2008, thus giving India some legitimacy for its nuclear program, the 
same privilege which is constantly denied to Iran. India still does not want to sign 
the NPT as it considers the nuclear a source of prestige and ultimate survival2. The 
exemptions given by the Nuclear Suppliers Group are something exceptional. Of 
course, in China this surprising move has been seen as a first step towards a future 
India-US alliance for containement of Chinese power. But things are not so simple as 
in India only a part of the population and decision-makers would be ready to accept 
an alliance with USA3, thus there is no consensus on an anti-China policy, not to 
speak about a full-fledged alliance. Anyway, angry on this Indian avoidance of the 
NPT filters, China continued for a time to oppose India’s aspirations to a permanent 
1 Jayakar PUPUL, Indira Gandhi: A Biography, Penguin Books India, New York, 1997, p. 225.
“Kissinger regrets India comments”, BBC News, 1 July, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/4640773.stm, accessed on 4 May 2013. ”This woman suckered us”, said Nixon 
of Indira Gandhi, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 2, 2010.
2 Karsten FREY, State Interests and Symbolism in India’s Nuclear Build-Up, South Asian 
Institute, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian Comparative Politics, October 2002; IDEM, India’s 
Nuclear Bomb and National Security, Routledge, London/New York, 2006; IDEM, Nuclear 
Weapons as Symbols. The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, Institute Barcelona d’Estudis 
Internacionals (IBEI), Working Paper, Barcelona, October, 2006.
3 Dwelling upon this aspect alone one should take into account the effort garnered by 
the Congress party and especially by Manmohan Singh to pass an agreement which threaten 
his government stay in power. Another factor involved in passing the deal through Indian 
Parliament concerned bribe and traffic of influence, as some cables made public by Wickileaks 
revealed three years later. Jason BURKE, ”Indian Government Tried to Buy Votes, Says WikiLeaks 
Cable”, The Guardian, March 17 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/india-
usa, accessed on 23 June 2012; ”Legislators Bribed in Nuclear Energy Policy, Cash for Poor Votes”, 
Green World Investor, March 17 2011, http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/03/17/wikileaks-
exposes-more-muck-in-indian-politics-satish-sharmanahiketa-kapurkarti-chidambaramm-k-
alagiri-legislators-bribed-in-nuclear-energy-policycash-for-poor-votes/, accessed on 4 April 
2013; Jim YARDLEY, Lydia POLGREEN, Hari KUMAR, ”In India, Leaked Cable About Bribes 
Sets Off a Furor”, The New York Times, March 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/
world/asia/18india.html?_r=0, accessed on 20 December 2012.
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seat with the US Security Council, even if its size and population enables it to have 
such desires.
Remembering the 1962 Border War: Sino-Indian Perceptions
This war is still rememberd by strategists and common people in the two 
countries as being an amazing clash between non-western and non-colonial states, 
a war among two states which have been occupied, humuliated and even colonised 
(the case of India) by foreign powers. The Aksai Chin and Arunashal Pradesh border 
disputes were salient at that time because the two young countries were dominated 
by strong ideologies and wanted to demonstrate the end of their subordinated role 
on the world stage.
Under the Communist leader Mao Zedong, China claimed the whole Tibet and 
got it without serious hindrances from outside but in its opinion the huge territory 
held by India and named Arunashal was also part of Tibet. Mao was commited to 
contest the Mc Mahon line, seen as an inheritance of the British colonial era, while 
India, led by prime minister Nehru, was committed to defend this line and had a 
spiritual commitment to the independence of Tibet.
In 1961, India adopted a more bolded stance, with a strategy of advance 
towards (the so-called ”forward policy”) the Chinese-hold land and an aggressive 
border patrolling. Beijing at the beginning gave orders to its military commanders 
to withdraw and avoid clashes, and thus Indian troops were ordered to advance and 
occupy Chinese posts, abandoned by their sentinels. This seems strange, as Nehru 
was well-known for his pacifism and avoidance of military preparedness. Henry 
Kissinger mentions that Mao revolutionarily changed the classical Chinese paradigm 
on war. While Confucianism insisted on general armony and avoidance of open 
conflicts, Mao wanted to enhance Chinese military power and engage in the defense 
of th disputed lands. The balance and the harmony were to give place to the clash of 
the wills.
Nehru had a special esteem for China and prised its fight for freedom agains 
foreign oppressive powers. He even dreamt at a big federation with China, India, 
Ceylon, Afghanistan that would have translated the Bandung spirit into an 
institutional reality, even if only at regional level1. He tried to resolve peacefully the 
border disputes with China, received the numerous Tibetans refugees, Dalai lama, and 
avoid enhancing the power of the armed forces, thus keeping India not well prepared 
for a possible clash with China. Indian soldiers were not well armed and equipped for 
a winter war in mountains, thus paying a heavy price to the geography and weather.
But British journalist Neville Maxwell, a well-known expert in Indian issues, has 
also a specific explanation for the escalation to war in 1962. He considers that India 
1 C.R. MOHAN, Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, the People’s Republic of China, and India (ACI) Region. ADBI Working Paper 
412, Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo, 2013. Available: http://www.adbi.org/
workingpaper/2013/03/15/5543.geopolitical.trends.security.asean.prc.india/, accessed on 
October 10, 2012. Not everyone had the same enthusiastic consideration towards Beijing and its 
red leaders. Vallabhai Patel, for some years Nehru’s second in command tried to open the eyes 
to the former that Chinese communism can foster as much aggression as any former European 
power. See Shasi THAROOR, Nehru...cit., p. 6.
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mistakenly interpreted the Mc Mahon line, believing that an advanced border post, 
the Dhola Post, was inside the line, while in fact Dhola was North of Mc Mahon line 
and thus legitmately claimed by China. Seeing that Indians had occupied position in 
this disputed area, Chinese army eventually launched a pre-emptive strike to liberate 
this land1. Mao Zedong, criticized by Soviet leader Nikita Krushkhev (”Why did you 
have to kill people on your border with India?”), answered that Indians crossed the 
Mc Mahon line and attacked first, and pretended that even Nehru did not knew about 
Indian forces mistakenly crossing Mc Mahon line! Retrospectively, and keeping in 
mind Nehru’s own explanations, the Indian strategy of claiming its colonial borders 
by using the so-called ”forward policy” could not be seen as an accident but as a 
deliberate movement. This strategy was aimed at intimidating the Chinese patrools 
and cutting their lines of communications2.
Neville Maxwel clearly explained India’s use of the colonial border in its zero-
sum game with China. According to his opinion, 
”the boundaries of India ceased to be the pawns of the British in their Great 
Games with imperial rivals, and became cell walls of a national identity. No 
longer could boundaries be conceived or shifted by men whose concern was no 
longer territory, but strategic advantage; henceforth they enclosed the sacred soil 
of the motherland, and politicians could tamper with them only at their peril”3.
The French military analyst Thérèse Delpech asserted that the border war may 
be also explained by China’s will ”to punish India for having granted asylum to the 
Dalai Lama after the 1959 Tibetan uprising”4. 
Der Primat der Innepolitk has a saying here also: a third strand of explanations 
highlight Beijing’s need to obtain some international success and cast China as 
besieged city in order to mollify the criticism against Mao’s Great Leap Forward5.
To the above mentioned causes another one, singled ou by David Malone was 
China’s upset with India’s harboring Chiang Kai-Shek’s agents. Chinese officials 
urged their southern Himalayan counterparts to get id of hem but New Delhi’s action 
was alleged halfhearted6. Ramachandra Guha speaks about Chinese followers of Dalai 
lama or Indian anti-communists giving voice to anti-Mao sloagans but nothing to the 
level of KMT members or agents of the Indian soil. In a climate of suspicion Beijing 
feared a Taiwanese invasion coupled perhaps with domestic riots. It is undoubtedly 
true that CIA trained anti-communist soldiers with the minimal hope of damaging 
the regime7. Further more, to add gas on the burning stowe, on April 22, 1962, KMT 
1 Neville MAXWELL, India’s China War, Random House, 2000.
2 IDEM, ”India’s China War. How the Chinese Saw the Conflict”, May 2011, http://china 
indiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/neville-maxwell-chinas-india-war.pdf, 
accessed on 7 February 2013.
3 IDEM, India’s China War, cit., p. 75.
4 Thérèse DELPECH, ”Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century”, Rand Corporation, Santa 
Monica, Ca., 2012, www.rand.org, pp. 76-77.
5 Claude ARPI, ”Why Mao attacked India in 1962”, Indian Defence Review, vol. 26, issue 3, 
July-Sept 2011, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/maos-return-to-power-passed-
through-india/, accessed on 2 May 2013.
6 David M. MALONE, Does the Elephant Dance?...cit., pp. 132-143.
7 Ramachandra GUHA, ”Jawaharlal Nehru and China…cit.”, pp. 20-24. 
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leader issued a communiqué where he threatened with mainland invasion. However 
this final hypothesis does not seem very robust as American ambassador to China, 
John Cabot assured his guest country that Washington did not support any move 
against Mao1. So any interference coming from outside as explanatory factor should 
be laid to rest in the background, behind those bilateral issues concerning only the 
Sino-Indian security complex.
Because the Chinese attack took part as the same time with the Cuban missile 
crisis and as it risks increased too much China’s power in Asia, both the USA and 
USSR reacted negatively. Washington considered this war a Chinese aggression, 
it condemned it with the UN, and in 1963, within the National Security Council, 
Robert McNamara stated that in case of a future attack by China against India, the 
USA should resort even to nuclear weapons. The idea that China could take huge 
territories from its big Asian neighbor by a quick war was unacceptable for the 
Americans, as it would have modified the regional balance of power in the benefit 
of the second biggest communist state in the world2. The Soviets were also angry 
because they considered China’s acts as dangerous, useless for the communist block, 
thus weakening the cohesion of the communist camp. From an ideological point of 
view, it is interesting that the USSR did not support up to the end the communist 
China (a broderly country) against the ”capitalist” (but non-aligned and reluctant to 
Western power) India3. Thus, one witnessed the total isolation of People’s Republic of 
China at that time (Chinese troops quickly withdrew from much of Indian territory 
they had occupied), but also the painful failure of Nehru as chief foreign policy maker 
on the Indian side.
The Disputed Borders: Why did Negotiations Fail?
For historic and geopolitical reasons, the two states are not completely satisfied 
with their current borders, claiming parts of the other’s territory. Beijing claims the 
Arunachal Pradesh state’s territory as being Chinese and belonging to historical 
Tibet. But Delhi invoke the Mc Mahon line, inherited from the British colonial era. 
In 1914, the British empire agreed on a border demarcation with Tibet, settling the 
fate of this 890 km border. Sir Henry Mc Mahon, the then-secretary for foreign affairs 
of the UK, played a major role in this activity. As expected, today China rejects the 
papers signed by a then-autonomous Tibet laders, claiming that Tibet is part of China 
and it should be China itself who establish its borders by directly negotiating with 
India. Interestingly, India is using a typical colonial border which is advantageous to 
1 Michael BRECHER, Jonathan WILKENFIELD, A Study of Crisis, University of Michigan 
Press, 1997, p. 386. For a study of Indo-US alliance in tha wake of 1962 debacle see also Khalid 
JAVED, The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the United States: A study of Indo-US Collaboration against 
China, US Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1962.
2 Thomas C. SCHELLING, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 
1966, p. 51, quoted by Thérèse DELPECH, ”Nuclear Deterrence…cit.”, p. 76.
3 Air Marshal RS BEDI, ”1962: Why the IAF Was Not Used”, Indian Defence Review, 
vol. 26, issue 1, Jan.-Mar. 2011, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/1962-why-the-
iaf-was-not-used/, accessed on 12 May 2013; Bharat VERMA, ”1962: The Nehruvian Blunder”, 
Indian Defence Review, vol. 27, issue 4, Oct.-Dec. 2012, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/
news/1962-the-nehruvian-blunder/, accessed on 20 May 2013.
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itself, against a country which has been historically traumatised by the intervention of 
foreign powers in its domestic affairs, in the 19-20th centuries, leading to the so-called 
”unequal treaties” and temporary lost of Manchuria and other areas. These treaties 
allowed imperial Russia, Japan but also Great Britain to take important peaces of land 
from Chinese homeland, as the Chinese empire was very week and unable to resist 
agressions commited by these powers individually – such as the opium wars with the 
British and the Japanese war of 1895 – or collectively such as in the case of the Boxers 
war at the beginning of the 20th century. Even today, Russia still enjoys vast amont of 
territory in Eastern Siberia which once belonged to the Celest Empire. 
Chinese officials generally name this territory situated at the South of Tibet and 
hold by India ”Southern Tibet” and sometimes consider Indians born in Arunachal as 
being Chinese citizens, thus claiming they don’t need visas to travel in China! India 
refers to it as Arunachal Pradesh (Assam Himalaya), a state created to counter the 
Chinese pretentions to a ”wider Tibet” and to have a military use in case of a new 
border war. China controls pices of land on the North-Western border of India, the 
Aksai Chin glacier and Shaksam valley (38.000 sq km), being an area of conflict, but 
also a piece of Kashmir, given by Pakistan to Beijing in 1963 (a surface of 5.200 sq 
km). India used to claim these territories and up to know did not give up its claims. 
Also India annexed the Sikkim in 1975, a fact which is still not officially recognized 
by China.
The first real attempts to normalize the situation were made in 1993 and 1996, 
when the two states agreed by singing The Treaty on maintenance of peace and 
tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and promised to enhance mutual 
trust, build confidence and prepare for a long term settlement of this issue. They 
established Confidence Building Measures on the border.
In order to avois escalating tensions, Delhi and Beijing signed in 2005 the Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question 
which emphasized the clear and uncontested delimitation of borders using only 
peaceful ways.It is an open-ended process. Later, they have created the Working 
Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on the border affairs in January 2012, during 
the 15th bilateral border talks. But the initiative has ben discussed and agreed first in 
December 2010, when Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao visited India1.
The years 2012 was declared the ”Year of India-China Friendship and Cooperation”. 
In spite of these good-will gestures, China and India still have contested borders 
and periodically they resort to what the Delhi government called ”cartographic 
aggressions”: both states issue passports for the other states’ citizens showing maps 
which reflect their will, not the current territorial line. The Indian media plays the 
game of nationalism, calling the Agni V long-range missile the ”China killer”, as it 
could easily hit Beijing and Shanghai! At the same time Agni VI received multiple 
warheads in order to hit simultaneoulsy many targets in China2.
1 Prashanth PARAMESWARAN, ”Sino-Indian Border Negotiations: Problems and Prospects”, 
China Brief, vol. 12, issue 6, March 15, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_
cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39141, accessed on March 25, 2013.
2 David KARL, ”Sino-Indian Relations Full of Contradictions”, March 13, 2013, 
www.foreignpolicyblogs.com, accessed on 20 April 2013.
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The Tibet Issue
As we said previously, for China the Tibet province is not complete without 
the so-called ”outher Tibet”, an area of 96.000 sq km occupied by India. This area 
known as Northeast Frontier Agency became in 1987 the Indian state Arunachal 
Pradesh. China has also a special claim for a territory in Arunachal called Tawang, a 
land where the Buddhist population used to have close links wih those of Tibet and 
where Beijing believes some rebellion plans aimed at territorial integrity of China 
were drafted. Tawang Monastery is a sacred place of the Tibetan Buddhism belonging 
to Indian territory in the area of contested border with China and analysts say that 
it is likely that this monastery will play a major role in the designation of the next 
Dalai Lama. Beijing could try to do something to alter the symbolic power of Tawang, 
short of conquering it directly and risk a general war with India. As the current Dalai 
Lama is 77 years old, there is a likelihood that China will find another candidate for 
being Lama and oppose it aggresively to the Indian candidate of Tawang1, in a contest 
remainding us of the pope-antipope classical struggle during European Middle Age 
and Rennaissance.
There are about 130.000 Tibetan refugees in India and also this country hosted the 
Dalai Lama, after he escaped Chinese invasion of 1950. India do not claim Tibet from 
China, but Chinese officials fear the support given by Delhi to Tibetan refugees, as 
long as there are separatist tendencies in Tibet. India does not trust Chinese intentions, 
as Beijing did not officially recognized Arunashal Pradesh belonging to India.
That is not all. The Eastern Indian area of Bengal is separated from the main 
body of the country by a slice corridor named Siliguri. This is a narrow stripe of 
land which separates China from Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. In case of a Chinese 
pre-emptive strike, coupled with a possible Bengalese support, India would have 
real problems in defending its eastern side. Strategic planning done by the Indian 
General Staff demonstrated that a massive Chinese attack could break the acces 
through Siliguri, letting the Eastern Benghal and Arunachal Pradesh isolated and the 
Indian armed forces there encircled. Of course, India could in the end retaliate with 
nuclear ballistic missiles and threaten big cities in China but this is really dangerous 
and should be avoid. Based on this Siliguri scenario, rumors run that some hard-
liners military people commissioned by the minister of Defense in Delhi drafted in 
2006 a strategic plan to reciprocate to a Chinese attack on the corridor with an attempt 
to destabilize Tibet by provoking a revolt of the local population and thus forcong 
Chinese forces to turn back. But this scenario envisages a neutralization of Pakistan, 
by a surprise move from Iran and Afghanistan. Confronted with threats from the 
1 Ibidem. The author stated that China pretends that the future Dalai Lama could be born 
only on Chinese land and in 1995 Beijing even kidnapped a 6 years old boy from Tibet, who has 
been declared by Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama, the second rank in the Buddhist hierarchy. 
It seems probable that the young Gendun Choekyi Nyima and his family members had been 
taken in Beijing under the custody of Chinese authorities. At the end of 1995 eventually the 
Chinese authorities succeeded in putting another child on the position of the Panchen Lama in 
Shigatse. Gendun is still missing and Indian authorities consider him as being held by Chinese. The 
most strange issue is that China is a laic state but its power quest make it interfere directly in the 
”business of monks” from Tibet! See ”Panchen Lama Turns 20”, http://www.asianews.it/news-
en/Panchen-Lama-turns-20.-For-14-years,-he-has-been-a-hostage-of-the-Chinese-government-
15085.html, accessed on April 25, 2013. 
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West/North, Pakistan should not be able to support China by putting pressure on 
the border with India in the Kashmire area and even threatening Delhi with a nucler 
strike. Otherwise, India could not count in anyway on a Pakistanese neutrality, since 
China is the main protector of Pakistan against India.
But oficially India has softer plans, even if different from a classical military 
defense vision. We know that in February 2012, the National Defense College and 
the Centre for Policy Research of India drafted a report called ”Nonalignement 2.0”1 
which proposed a new strategy for border conflicts with China. Thus, in case of a 
Chinese aggression, India would not try to defend the attacked territory but it would 
try to grab also a piece of Chinese territory and then negotiate a mutual exchange 
and restauration of the territorial status quo2. Of course, this scenario is based on the 
axioma that India is the satisfied power and China the revisionist one. But what is 
more important is that this scenario heavily borrowed from that which was drafted 
by the MoD in 2006: thus India could try to mount an insurgency in the Chinese-
occupied areas in order to hurt the fighting potential of Chinese troops and break 
their supply lines. The 2006 MoD planning allowed even to instigate ethnic rebellions 
in Chinese provinces along the border, in case of Indian-Chinese war, but it seems that 
this possibility is kept for a last resort movement, as it has the potential for escalating 
for more brutal forms of confrontation. The 2012 report has involved not only private 
think-tanks but also the participation and support of the National Security Advisor S. 
Menon3, and this may be a signal given by Delhi to Beijing that it will be less and less 
tolerant with the numerous incursions that Chinese soldiers are doing in the disputed 
areas, according to Indian sources.
Currently, China enhanced the defense of Siliguri by deploying SU 30 air-fighters 
planes in Assam state. Anyway, Delhi is facing a strategic nightmare because a border 
war in the North would be in most of a cases a two-front war, excepting the situation 
in which Pakistan would launch an aggression in Kashmir and China would stay 
neutral.
Indian military analysts know that recently China invested a lot in developing 
the railway and roads networks in the Tibet Autonomous Region, near the Indian 
border, certainly with a military use4. There are five air bases, a number of helipads, 
but also a long rail network and more than thirty thousand kilometers of roads.
The thirty division deployed in that area – meaning about 160.000 troops – could 
be able to travel quickly in case of need, and also the geography is advantaging 
China in Tibet and in Himalayan mountains. Chinese could overpass Indians by 3 
to 1 in infantry and benefit from better geographic positions to do the fight. Chinese 
troops must travel through a plain highland area, while Indian soldiers must climb 
the mountain in a frosty and difficult area. This is especially true for Aksai Chin but 
not only there. In reaction, Delhi decided to station the BrahMos supersonic cruise 
missile in Arunachal Pradesh, which was seen in China as the first deployment of an 
offensive tactical missile ready to hit Chinese targets.
1 ”Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century”, 
Center for Policy Research, February 2012. http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/
NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf, accessed on March 24, 2013.
2 Prashanth PARAMESWARAN, ”Sino-Indian Border Negotiations…cit.”.
3 Ibidem.
4 Rajeswari Pillai RAJAGOPALAN, Kailash PRASAD, ”Sino-Indian Border Infrastructure: 
Issues and Challenges”, ORF Issue Brief, no. 23, August 2010.
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The fact that India and China do increase their military power in the disputed 
areas, that they sometimes tend to allow their military to cross the border in a 
provocative way and that they invest in transport infrastructure suggest that the 
political leaders do not want to be seen domestically and internationally as pacifist 
and hesitant. Giving satisfaction to the nationalist supporters or simply relying on the 
military advicers who are against the compromise, they prefer to prolonge a dangerous 
situation rather than to negotiate a peaceful and rational settlement like India giving 
up claims on Aksai Chin and China not claiming anymore Southern Tibet.
The Military Balance: Still Favorable to China?
Currently, China greatly overpass India in terms of GDP percentage allocated for 
defense and total sums: more than 100 billion dolars in 2012, compared with 30-32 
billions dollars for India.
Since 2008, India keeps some medium to long range missile Agni III as a final 
deterrent near the border with China, which are clearly aiming at big chinese cities, 
situated at more than 2000 kilometers, and not at the Pakistanese cities and bases 
which are not so remote. Agni V is said to run 5000 km thus threatening even Eastern 
Chinese cities. In Hindu language, Agni mans ”fire”, thus this weapon has a symbolic 
appearance.
Anyway, India and China do not want do develop their military capabilities in a 
purely zero-sum game pattern, aiming at each other while not having any dialogue, in 
spite of the nationalist-ethos which stayes behind large segments of their populations. 
This is the reason whay they tried to develop a minimum defense cooperation and 
dialogue, in spite of the border disputes. In 2007 and 2008 some common military 
exercises were held, and since 2008 at least three rounds of the so-called India-China 
Annual Defense Dialogue. But in August 2010, this dialogue has been suspended, 
after China denied the visa request by chief of the Indian Northern Command to visit 
China in an official mission. China frequently irirtates Indian authorities by denying 
visas to high military Indian officials, especially those born in Arunachal Pradesh, 
and by distorting maps of the common borders.
The year 2012 has been proclaimed the ”Year of India-China Friendship and 
Cooperation”, thus the projects for military cooperation were enhanced. Even the 
Indian opposition seems to accept this as something necessary. The leader of the main 
India’s opposition party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Sushma Swaraj stated that ”if 
the armies of our two great countries forge an understanding, the future generations 
are assured of peace and stability. Much bad blood has flowed, its time to begin 
anew for the sake of future”1. This is an interesting turn, sice BJP traditionally put an 
emphasis on the ”China threat” using the nationalist myths which are cherished by 
Hindu chauvinists. India and China decided to resume bilateral military exercises. 
Some authors, however, identified a structural handicap for the Indian establishment, 
namely the poor quality of the defense diplomacy. This is due to a lack of historic 
experience but also to the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Defense and 
1 Bhartendu Kumar SINGH, ”Sino-Indian Defense Dialogue: A Panacea for the Sino-Indian 
Security Dilemma?”, China Brief, vol. 13, issue 6, March 15, 2013, www.jamestown.org.
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs1. The civilian decision-makers do not allow enough 
freedom in action for the military, they are not able to establish creative full-fledged 
relations with military from other countries. Concerning the relations with China, 
Indian political elites seem more reactive than proactive, they tend to consider Chinese 
activities as aggressive and avoid enhancing military cooperation.
Is India the Trojan Horse of the USA? Not Really!
There are few doubts that both China and India put a bigger emphasis on their 
relation with the USA than on their bilateral relations. They know that they could 
influence Washington’s foreign policy and security policy behavior and they tend to 
define their own role on the international arena through the lenses of their relations 
with the USA. For China, the things seem more obvious and less controversial: there 
is a majority of Chinese population and decision-makers who want their country to 
be on an equal foot with the systemic hegemon, dreaming at a multipolar world or at 
least at a bipolar one. Thus, Chinese-American relations are imagined to be mainly co-
operative in the economic and trading fields and more competitive in the hard security 
area. Chinese decision-makers want a continuous economic cooperation which, they 
think, will in the end turn favorable to China and unfavorable to Washington, thus 
China could emerge as an equal power (in a multipolar system) or even as the number 
one, without having to properly fight a war. The famous thesis of the US hegemonic 
decline, launched  decaded ago by historian Paul Kennedy, and based on the over-
stretching effect is certainly much appreciated and trusted in many Chinese circles. 
Other Chinese, the more hawkish ones, even think at a clash for Taiwan in which 
China could deterr US from intervening and thus greatly errode American image.
For India, the scenarios are not so clear-cut, the national role is not so exactly 
well-known and making a real consensus at the level of decision-makers and the 
population. Of course, there are adepts of a clear-cut alliance with USA and Japan 
against China and their arguments rests on Chinese aggresive geopolitical activity2, 
like the ”pearl string” strategy – the chain of Chinese military bases and facilities on 
islands surrounding the Indian continental mass. On the other side, the adepts of 
neutrality shake hands with those who are against US hegemony in the third world: 
leftists and other groups. Thus, taking a decision like that of an alliance with the 
US and Japan against China would be very difficult, given the lack of a domestic 
consensus and the risks of Chinese retaliation, even pre-emptive strike. Maybe some 
USA neoconservatives think that India would automatically prefer an alliance with 
Washington, as it will be afraid by Chinese expanding power but nothing is sure. 
Neocons and also some neorealists assert that China-India relations will be ”marked 
by increase suspicion and rivalry”3 but they ignore the prudence of mainstream 
Indian decision-makers, they care to avoid provocative behavior and self-fulfilling 
prophecies. The fact that India grows in power does not mean that it will eventually 
1 C. Raja MOHAN, ”From Isolation to Partnership: The Evolution of India’s Military 
Diplomacy”, ISAS Working Paper, no. 144, February 20, 2012.
2 J. Mohan MALIK, ”China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing 
Rivalry”, The China Quarterly, vol. 142, June 1995, pp. 317-355/p. 326.
3 David KARL, ”Sino-Indian Relations…cit.”.
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begin to contain China and thus playing on the US grand strategy to limit Chinese 
power. More than that, the current Obama administration in US does not seem to 
encourage India to become an adversary of China.
Cooperation Could Work/Cracked Open Door Policy
China and India belongs to the so-called BRICS countries, they are among the most 
fast-growing economies in the world and in order to cooperate it seems at a first glance 
that they only need to behave in a rational manner, as their economic cooperation could 
in theory increase their level of wealth. But in fact their economies are not hundert 
percent complementary and in many instances there is a clear competition between the 
two states to have access to new markets and to available enregy resources. Of course, 
there are areas of cooperation. In 2005, the two countries declared their willingness for 
a strategic partnership and more than that, the Indian environment minister, Jairam 
Ramesh used the word ”Chindia” to describe the future interdependence and closeness 
between the two states and nations1. In spite of rich narratives of brotherhood between 
the two nations, historical records and the issue of border disputes still hinder the 
normalizing of bilateral relations. Obviously, speaking about Chindia suggested a 
possible shared interests and strategy in global affairs2, a sense of solidarity, but the 
evolution in the last decade suggest this would not be the case.
The trade between India and China is quite consistent, reaching more than 51 
billion USD in 2008 and being more and more diverse. In 2011 it reched 73,4 billion 
dollars3. But India is buying much more than it is selling to China, thus having a trade 
deficit of more than 16 billion USD in 2007-20084. There are some sensitivities which 
sometimes hindered the trade, as is the case of rare earths on which Beijing has a 
monopoly and electronic devices sold by India.
India has a trade balance deficit with China of 40 billion USD, meaning about 2% 
of the GDP. The Indian currency, the rupee, is considerably weaker than the Chinese 
renminbi.
1 Bo MA, ”Chindia – Cooperation or Competition under the Strategic Partnership”, Journal 
of East European and Asian Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, November 2010, pp. 455-473/p. 456. For a more 
general information see Jairam RAMESH, Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India, 
India Research Press, New Delhi, 2005.
2 Partha IYENGAR, Jamie POPKIN, ”The Exponential Power of Chindia”, 6 September 
2007, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-09-06/the-exponential-power-of-chindia 
businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice, accessed on April 2, 2013. 
According to the authors, ”We are witnessing new joint ventures between Indian IT service firms 
and their Chinese counterparts, early illustrations of how a formidable Chindia economy could 
develop. Indian firms bring to the table world-class software expertise and leadership in global 
markets. Chinese partners have legions of capable, low-cost employees and greater know-how 
with clients in Japan, Korea, and other Asian countries where English is less prevalent”.
3 ”India-China Trade Hits All Time High of $73.9 Billion in 2011”, NDTV Profit, January 29, 
2012, http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-india-china-trade-hits-all-time-high-of-
73-9-billion-in-2011-296742, accessed on 10 May 2013; ”India-China Trade Hits All Time High 
of $ 73.9 bn in 2011”, The Economic Times, Jan. 30, 2012.
4 David SCOTT, ”South Asia in China’s Strategic Calculus”, in Shaun BRESLIN (ed.) 
Handbook of China’s International Relations, Routledge, London and New York, 2010, pp. 209-218/
p. 214.
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Communications do not work at an optimum level: there are no direct flights 
between Beijing, Shanghai and Mumbai, and India does not attract a significant share 
of Chinese foreign investments1.
In 2008, China was already the second biggest trading country for India, after the 
USA and the bilateral trade was worthing about 55 billions USD in 2010, a spectacular 
increase from the 18 billions USD in 20052. The India’s target is to reach 100 billion 
by 2015, according to Asit Tripathy, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry3.
India seems less dependent on exports than China and effectively attracted less 
direct foreign investments, a fact which could be explained also by the fact that its 
economic liberalisation began only in 1991, more than a decade after China opened 
to the globalized economy. The two states must enhance their cross-investments, 
guarantee a free trade area or at least avoid protectionist measures such as the anti-
dumping policy. Even if both prefer to trade with the USA and EU, they must ensure 
mutual benefits from economic cooperation at a higer level4. We should mention 
that since 2002 there are direct flights between India and China, but, in spite of this 
the exchange of visitors is not significant: in 2007 there were only 270.000 combined 
visitors, for a population of more than 2 billion5!
A good starting point is the evidence that the world economic crisis made the 
USA and European markets less opened to Asian products, more protectionists and 
mercantilists.
India exported to China especially iron ore, semi-finished iron and steel, minerals, 
plastic products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cotton, marine products etc.6. China sells 
to India various electronic items, electrical machinery and equipment, various organic 
chemicals, mineral fuels (coal), but also oil and other oil products (lubricants).
Numbers alone tell us only half of the story. If one compares Indo-Chinese trade 
figures with EU-India or EU-China than one has to compare 74 billion dollars against 
$110 billion and, respectively, $400 billion7. In conclusion none of them is dependent 
on each other to the extent both of them are to the EU. 
1 ”Friend, Enemy, Rival, Investor. How Can India Make its Economic Relations with China 
Less Lopsided?”, 30 June 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21557764, accessed on 
10 May 2013.
2 Swapan BHATTACHARYA, Biswa BHATTACHARYAY, ”Gains and Losses of India-
China Trade Cooperation – A Gravity Model Impact Analysis”, CESIFO Working paper, 
no. 1970, April 2007, www. ssrn.com, accessed on May 10, 2010.
3 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-10-26/news/34750100_1_india-china- 
trade-china-international-auto-parts-bilateral-trade, 26 October 2012, accessed on 20 April 
2013.
4 B.M JAIN, ”India–China Relations: Issues And Emerging Trends”, The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 93, issue 374, 2004, pp. 253-256.
5 Suisheng ZHAO, ”Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations”, Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 115, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 2-3.
6 Ratna VADRA, ”Trade Expansion of India and China”, 2012 International Conference on 
Economics and Finance Research IPEDR, vol. 32 (2012), Singapore, http://www.ipedr.com/
vol32/013-ICEFR2012-Q10029.pdf, accessed on 3 May 2013. 
7 B. RAMNA, ”India and China in Europe”, Sri Lanka Guardian, 21 December 2010, http://
www.srilankaguardian.org/2010/10/india-china-in-europe.html, accessed on 10 April 2012; 
”India-EU FTA to Create Jobs, Boost Trade: IEBF”, The Economic Times, Jan. 4, 2013.
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To add extra information a relatively good help is provided by the Index of 
Globalization. As shown bellow China’s openness in economic and social terms fares 
significantly higher than India’s.
Table 1
2012 KOF Index of Globalization1
No. country
Globali-
zation
Index
country
Economic
Globali-
zation
country
Social
Globali-
zation
country
Political
Globali-
zation
1 Belgium 92.76 Singa-pore 97.39 Cyprus 91.76 Italy 98.43
2 Ireland 91.95 Luxem-bourg 94.63 Ireland 91.43 France 98.21
3 Nether-lands 90.94 Ireland 93.27 Singapore 91.04 Belgium 97.91
4 Austria 90.55 Malta 92.23 Austria 90.28 Austria 97.31
5 Singa-pore 89.18 Belgium 92.15 Belgium 89.75 Spain 96.68
6 Sweden 88.23 Nether-lands 91.91
Switzer-
land 89.43
United 
Kingdom 96.43
7 Denmark 88.11 Hungary 90.50 Canada 88.72 Sweden 95.86
8 Hungary 87.38 Sweden 88.98 Nether-lands 87.87 Poland 95.17
9 Portugal 86.73 Bahrain 88.96 Denmark 86.19 Portugal 94.36
Even after the post1991 liberalisation India remains more protectionist than its 
transHimalayan counterpart, especially if we focus on commodification and trade 
numbers: 
1 The Index of Globalization is a recent measure divided in four segments: political 
globalization, economic globalization and social globalization. 
For the political globalization are taken into account following variables: Absolute number 
of embassies in a country; Absolute number of international inter-governmental organizations, 
personnel contributions to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita; number of international 
treaties signed - any document signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest 
legislative body of each country since 1945. Not ratified treaties, or subsequent actions, and 
annexes are not included.
For the economic globalization variables are: data on actual flows trade (percent of GDP); 
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP); Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP); 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP); hidden import barriers; mean tariff 
rate; taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue); capital account restrictions.
For the social globalization variables are: data on personal contact; telephone taffic; 
transfers of money (percent of GDP); international tourism- sum of arrivals and departures of 
international tourists as a share of population; International letters (per capita) as registred to 
Universal Postal Union, Postal Statistics database; Internet Users (per 1000 people); Television 
(per 1000 people); Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP).
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Figure 1
Exports of Goods and Services in China and India (Current US$ Billion)
Ganeshan WIGNARAJA, ”Will India Overtake China in the Next Decade?”, Vox, 29 Sep-
tember 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/article/will-india-overtake-china-next-decade, accessed 
on May 5, 2013.
Because from a strategic point of view, decision-makers, especially those of India, 
perceive a security dilemma situation concerning Indo-Chinse relations, there is a 
reluctance to increase the size and structure of the trade, as this could benefit more 
China than India. Certainly, Indians envy Chinese prosperity and huge economic 
increase but some think that in the end, the democratic system and social openess, 
specific to India, will ensure a more balanced situation. Indians are hesitant to a 
spectacular increase of the trade with China, fearing a situation which would largely 
be in the advantage of Beijing. The classical issue in the IR theory, the problem of the 
relative vs. absolute gains in cooperative frameworks is to be applied to this example. 
The two countries do not have a free-trade agreement and India sometimes imposed 
anti-dumping taxes on some Chinese goods. Chinese economy grew in 2011-2012 
with about 9,5% by year and India with 7,5%. This is a spectacular rate of growth, 
comparing with what Japan and South Korea managed to do in the same period.
China and India certainly rivalise regarding exports of garments, textiles, 
electronics and light machinery, they are also competing for attracting foreign 
capitals1. But if they were able to create a free-trade area, this could seriously increase 
their common power on the international markets.
1 Ibidem.
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How to Counter the ”Realist”-minded Western Naratives 
on the Fatal Clash between the Dragon and the Elephant?
Currently, both the Chinese and Indian strategists and the decision-makers 
perfectly know that their countries will act not only in accordance with the traditional 
behavior guided by the dominant philosophy, not only influenced by a healthy 
pragmatism but also to confirm or to deny the western scenarios. A lot of famous 
IR experts and strategic studies pundits such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Fareed 
Zakaria write in their articles and books on the spectacular rise of India1, nearly 
matching China’s well-known rise and Japan’s development in the years 70-80s. 
Thus, the national role conception of Chinese and Indian decision-makers will be 
influenced also by the western ideas on them. But being well aware of these foreign 
expectations and not taking them as ”scientific” predictions could also induce them to 
behave differently, thus avoiding self-fulfilling prophecy mechanisms.
A military conflict between China and India would certainly be a terrible, bloody 
and devastating one, because they are the most populous countries in the world, with 
nuclear weapons and huge land armies. It could attract other Asian powers in a huge 
regional war and provoke the ruin of Asia, stopping its economic and demographic 
rising, and also its emergence as number one region in international affairs
India and China both passed through tough moments in their history: for China, 
the 19th century has been the ”century of humiliation”, while India had been a colony 
between the 19th and the 20th century, a full century of humiliation and submission, of 
course more if we consider also the Mughal centuries of domination. This is a shared 
inheritance of the former Western hegemony in world affairs, excepting the Muslim 
period in India. But despite this link, one can say that nationalism and the military 
build up may end in a classical security dilemma mechanism, even increased by the 
configuration of Asian alliances. 
On the other hand, China and India, seen as probable rivals by the realist-minded 
western analysts, were described as ”natural” strategic allies by some Russian experts 
and politicians. One of the most spectacular proposals involving India and China 
in a single project was Russia’s former minister of foreign affairs Evgheni Primakov 
proposal or 1996 to create a strategic triangle with Delhi, Beijing and Moscow, in order 
to balance against US systemic hegemony and deny unipolarity’s long term existance2. 
Primakov has been a famous adept of the Eurasian doctrine of Russian foreign policy. 
Today, Russia is focusing mainly on the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO), while its partnership with China is based on the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). Interestingly, India is an observer state with the SCO. Even if 
these two security and defense groups could be reunited under a single roof – which 
is greatly problematic because of China and Russia sensitivities – we would be still 
far from a real strategic triangle. India is not ready for such a triple alliance, fearing 
1 Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, Strategic Vision, cit., and Fareed ZAKARIA, Lumea postamericană, 
cit.
2 Stephen BLANK, ”Primakov’s Russia/India/China Triangle Nears Realization”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, vol. 2, issue 79, April 22, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_
cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30293, accessed on May 10, 2013.
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China’s increasing power and the risks of an open conflict with USA1. Thus, China 
and Russia are strategic partners, Russia and India are also strategic partners, but not 
India and China, thus breaking the ”triangle”. During the late Cold War era, as one 
expert put ”In South Asia, Soviet-Indian relations functioned as a balance against 
the China-Pakistan axis backed by the US”2. So, even after the bipolar competition, 
there is a lack of trust in strategic issues between China and India, while Pakistan is 
traditionally one of the strongest sources of divide for them. As a concrete example, 
Delhi cannot forget that decades ago, Pakistani government gave China a piece of 
Kashmer, claimed by India.
Conclusions. The Dragon Is Not Bound to Eat the Elephant, Nor to 
Be Crushed by It, or It is Anything Unescapable in World Politics? 
Taking into account its economic and strategic activities during the last decande, 
China seems preoccupied with a strategy of developing commercial and naval bases 
in the Indian Ocean, the so-called ”string of pearls”3. The main bases used by Chinese 
are in Gwadar (Pakistani coast), Hambantotta (Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangladesh, 
the Bay of Bengal) and on several points on the coast of Burma. Other states that 
Beijing aims at integrating in its strategy are Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives. 
India replicated by enhancing its military capabilities in the Andaman Islands and 
Nicobar archipelago, by creating a regional ad-hoc command. Thus, one could see 
encirclement/counter-encirclement strategies4.
But this is not very clear if these strategic points have, from Beijing’s perspective, 
mainly a military goal, such as limiting the Indian navy ability to project its power, or 
if it’s mainly a way to ”help economically liberate landlocked inner China”, as Robert 
Kaplan mentioned5. Certainly, one important goal, may be the most important now, 
is the access to oil and gas from the Middle East by controling the straits and other 
vital points on the South-Asian coast and also the development of Beijing’s naval 
diplomacy6. Waterways seem cheaper than land railway and highway network from 
China to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma and other areas. But is’s probable that China 
will try to build also this land infrastrcuture of transportation, having both an economic 
and a military use. Kaplan calls these ”dual-use civilian-military facilities where basing 
arrangements will be implicit rather than explicit, and completely dependent on the 
1 Akihiro IWASHITA, ”Primakov Redux? Russia and the ’Strategic Triangles’ in Asia”, 
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_1_ses/09_iwashita.pdf, pp. 165-194, acce-
ssed on March 20, 2013. 
2 Ibidem, p. 179.
3 Ioana Bianca BERNA, ”China în noua arhitectură de securitate a Oceanului Indian”, 
Monitor Strategic, no. 3-4, 2010, pp. 45-57/pp. 49-50. The author thinks that China is using the 
three fleets – Beihai, Donhai, Nanhai – to create ”a geopolitical network of strategic knots that 
China uses trying to put an end the regional activities of USA, to annihilate the Indian rival and 
to become the pivotal dominant state with the Indian Ocean” (p. 49).
4 Robert KAPLAN, ”Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean”, 
Foreign Affairs, March-April, 2009, http://www. realc-learpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/
rivalry_in_the_indian_ocean.html, accessed on June 10, 2010.
5 IDEM, Monsoon, Random House, New York, 2010, pp. 10-11.
6 Ioana Bianca BERNA, ”China în noua arhitectură de securitate...cit.”, p. 49.
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health of the bilateral relationship in question”1. Kaplan famously stated that ”China 
expands vertically India horizontally”, anticipating that the competition between 
them will be ”less on land than in a naval realm”2. It is not very important if China 
really wants to use these bases against India, but the fact that Indian officials probably 
think so. Feeling encircled, India will be less tolerant with Chinese activities near 
the common border. The main fields of interests for China – transport corridors, gas 
pipelines and deep water ports – are considered by India as being negative factors for 
its future development, and possible threats. Recently, a new government in Maldive, 
resulted from a coup, replaced the former pro-Indian leadership with a pro-Chinese 
one, thus giving a Chinese company a lucrative contract for modernising the Male 
airport, in spite of the fact that an Indian company had a contract of 500 million USD 
with the Maldivian government.
Although this strategy of the ”string of pearls” is not a self-fulfilling prophecy, but 
could be merely a long-term disturbance prompting more negotations and political 
dialogue3. Brzezinski commented that China’s rise would probably meet more 
resistance than USA faced during its rise as hegemon, because China does not have 
a ”favorable geographical location” or historic circumstances. China depends on the 
economic adaptability of Asia and on the accepance of its rise by direct neighbors4.
If one believes the official position, the 18th Report of the Communist Party Congres 
in China in November 2012, outlined the peaceful nature of China’s foreign policy:
”China is following unabately the way of peaceful development and firmly 
promotes an independent foreign policy, based on peace”.
Hu Jintao, still the president of People’s Republic at that time, assumed the 
document which insisted on the ”red lines” for his country: 
”We are firm in protecting the sovereignty, security and development 
interests of China and we will never give up to the foreign pressures”5.
”China promotes the peace agreements with the international disputes and 
is strongly opposed to the use of violence or to any other foreign-led attempt 
to undermine the legitimate governments of these countries, including the 
terrorism, in any form.”6
Thus, the Chinese line is based on anti-hegemonic practices, justice, fairness and 
peace. ”China will never try to fulfill hegemony and will abstain from expansionist 
practices.”7
1 Robert KAPLAN, Monsoon, cit., p. 11.
2 Ibidem, p. 13.
3 For an US (American) point of view on the China’s string of pearls see Cristopher 
PHERSON, ”String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenges of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian 
Littoral”, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, July 2006, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pdffiles/pub721.pdf, accessed on April 20, 2012.
4 Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, Strategic Vision, cit., p. 89.
5 Hu JINTAO, ”Raport la cel de-al XVIII-lea Congres al PCC Chinez”, 2012, Romanian 
edition, 2012, p. 71.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem.
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Concerning the neighbors, the document depicts them as friends and partners, 
relations of friendship and cooperation and ”we must ensure that China’s development 
will bring bigger benefits to our neighbors”1. Among the neighbors, the so-called 
”developing countries” are the privileged partners for China. For them, China will 
be ”a loial friend” and a ”sincere partner”. But Indian officials do not really seem 
ready to believe that rethoric, especially since the Chinese patrools again entered the 
disputed territory of Eastern Ladakh in April 2013, more than 15 kilometers, claiming 
it was Chinese territory and pitching tents. Some Indians fear that China may be even 
eyeing the waters of the Shyok and Chang Chenmo rivers, to be used for domestic 
consumption and agriculture in the arid Aksai Chin area. China is already building 
a dam on the Brahmaputra River, thus potentially depriving India of some needed 
water. Delhi would like to establish a Brahmaputra River Valley Authority to share 
the waters and prevent China to endanger the environment in this ecosystem2.
One of the main problems of the current Chinese foreign policy is the emergence 
of ultra-nationalism among young people. The Communist Party leaders seem to 
encourage the nationalist propaganda in order to legitimize their power and compensate 
the huge unequality that globalization and capitalism produced in the domestic society. 
They do not dare to hinder huge nationalistic street demonstration against Japan for the 
possession of some disputed islands, fearing that these masses would in the end turn 
against the communist monopolistic power. As one analyst put it 
”the new Chinese leadership will be tempted to please its domestic base by 
adopting more nationalistic foreign policies….. A more nationalistic, hard-line 
route would inevitably cause more conflict and direct confrontation with China’s 
neighbors, even to the point of war”3.
The new foreign affairs minister Wang Yi, his successor and supervisor, Yang 
Jiechi, the prime minister Li Keqiang and the president Xi Jinping, all of them must 
take care to define a non-provocative line of conduct towards the neighboring states, 
avoiding the nationalistic tendencies to ”colour” these relations. The seven members 
of the ”aristocratic” Politburo Standing Committee also have a great responsibility 
in this area. India also has a growing nationalism, one based on the Hindu ethnic 
group. Chinese tend to be at odds with almost all the neighbors: Japan, Vietnam, 
Philippines and India. They claim islands and maritime borders which are difficult 
to agree by the neighboring states. China’s assertiveness regarding borders and 
neighbors could be explained not only by rational calculation of power in an anarchic 
environment but also by the quickly emerging narratives which are spread in the 
political circles and determine the politicians to act in a resolute way to prevent 
opponents from winning the hearts and minds on a nationalistic public opinion4. The 
famous American Sinologue Alastair Iain Johnston recently spoke about the ”media 
1 Ibidem, p. 72.
2 Roomana HUKIL, ”India, China & the Brahmaputra: Riparian Rivalry”, 31 March 2013, 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/india-china-the-brahmaputra-
riparian-rivalry-3864.html, accessed on 2 April 2013.
3 Zheng WANG, ”Does China Have a Foreign Policy?”, 20 March 2013. http://www.
wilsoncenter.org/article/does-china-have-foreign-policy, accessed on 23 April 2013.
4 Alastair Iain JOHNSTON, ”How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?”, 
International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, pp. 7-48. For a general perspective on China’s 
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blogosphere interaction” as a determinant factor explaining the nature and speed 
of future security dilemmas involving China and other competitors1. Some Indian 
strategists mention that Delhi ”rejects the balance of power approach to security and 
looks at the world through the conceptual lenses of a co-operative society”2. India 
is presented as wanting peaceful change, not the preservation of status quo: a new 
economic order, multipolarity with the states system, traditional support for national 
liberation struggle and ideals of social justice3. This may be true, but when confronted 
with the danger of a devastating war, Indian decision-makers could choose in the end 
the classical deterrence means, mainly the balancing strategy.
Thus, it could be difficult for China and India to engage in new and positive 
relations in spite of the past experiences regarding land and borders. The leaders are 
frequently influenced by the narrartives of the so-called ”inescapable clash” between 
the two states, based on the traditional vision. 
Certainly there are similarities between India and China like the demographic 
size, the geographic location, the experience of past historic humiliations, the huge 
domestic difficulties and mass poverty, not to speak about the reluctance to accept 
western domination of the world system. They are nuclear powers and have huge 
land armies. Both belong to the BRICS group of states with emergent economies. 
On the other side, the differences between them are also important: India is a 
federal democracy, while China is a market-oriented authoritarian/totalitarian 
regime and is certainly a much more economically developed stated. Their clashing 
nationalisms and competing elites may prove formidable obstacles on the way of 
normalising the bilateral relations.
strategic culture in history see especially IDEM, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 
Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton University Press, 1995.
1 Ibidem, p. 48.
2 Shrikant PARANJPE, ”Foundations and Development of Indian Strategic Perspectives”, 
in Francois VREY, Thomas MANDRUP, Abel ESTERHUYSE (eds.), On Strategy. Strategic Theory 
and Contemporary African Armed Conflicts, Sun Media, Stellenbosch, 2010, p. 108.
3 Ibidem.
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